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Introduction 
In April 2004, towards the end of its third term, the Howard Government 
announced its intention to abolish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC), the statutory centerpiece of Commonwealth 
Indigenous affairs administration over the previous fifteen years. In so doing 
Prime Minister Howard and his Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
and Indigenous Affairs, Senator Amanda Vanstone, referred to ATSIC as an 
‘experiment in separate….elected representation, for Indigenous people’ 
which had been a ‘failure’ and which would not be replaced. Instead a group 
of ‘distinguished Indigenous people’ would be appointed to ‘advise’ the 
government and ATSIC’s former programs would be ‘mainstreamed’ to line 
government departments, though there would still be ‘a major policy role’ 
for the Minister for Indigenous Affairs (Howard and Vanstone 2004). 
 
In this essay, I will focus on the way in which the idea of past policy 
failure has become the driving motif of Australian Indigenous affairs during 
the fourth Howard Government and how, in the name of failure, the 
Government has argued repeatedly for significant organizational and policy 
change. The first section of the essay documents, in chronological style, this 
constant linking of the idea of failure with arguments for change. The second 
section asks, in a more analytic style, what sort of change is now occurring 
in Australian Indigenous affairs? I argue that the change is best thought of as 
a generational revolution, which combines a major disowning of the work of 
the previous generation in Indigenous affairs with a significant ideological 
swing to the right. I suggest that this generational revolution has taken some 
seven or eight years to build and can be related to two major dimensions of 
Australian Indigenous affairs policy; its highly morally-charged nature and 
its highly cross-cultural nature. I also suggest that a similar generational 
revolution, drawing on the same moral and cross-cultural dynamics but 
moving in the opposite ideological direction, occurred in Australian 
Indigenous affairs between 1967 and 1976. This identification of two 
generational revolutions in Australian Indigenous affairs in the last forty 
years could perhaps encourage governments of all ideological persuasions to 
be a little more cautious about abandoning established approaches in 
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Indigenous affairs, in the name of failure, and striking out so self-assuredly 
on supposedly new, more enlightened, more informed paths. 
 
Failure and change 
In February 2005, in an address to the National Press Club as the continuing 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs in the 
new, fourth Howard Government, Senator Amanda Vanstone identified as a 
‘brutal reality’ that: 
 
for all the dollars spent – over decades – and for all the goodwill, we are a long way 
from seeing all first Australians enjoy the opportunities the rest of us take for 
granted (Vanstone 2005a: 1). 
 
This condemnation of an inadequate past was returned to several times as 
Minister Vanstone went on ‘happily’ to outline a ‘quiet revolution’ that was  
‘already underway’ in Indigenous affairs, even though the legislation to 
abolish ATSIC was still, at that time, yet to finally pass the Senate.1 The 
Minister identified two ‘key aspects to this change’, both of which, in 
pointing the way forward, also condemned the past. The first was ‘genuinely 
giving Indigenous Australians a voice’, which she argued ATSIC had not. 
The second was ‘realising that the way we work, the way we organise 
ourselves as governments, has been a large part of the problem’ (Vanstone 
2005a: 1-2). Expanding on this last, Vanstone outlined the recent  
establishment of  a network of regional Indigenous Coordination Centres, 
through which Indigenous communities could ‘deal with the Australian 
Government as a whole’, and an Office of Indigenous Policy Co-ordination 
within her department in Canberra (Vanstone 2005a: 6-7). She also pointed 
to a Secretaries Group which was meeting monthly in Canberra, through 
which ‘some of our best public servants’ were ‘turning their minds to the 
issue’. There was also a parallel Ministerial Taskforce meeting regularly, 
both with the Secretaries Group and with the foreshadowed Indigenous 
advisory body, the National Indigenous Council (NIC). All this, Minister 
Vanstone said, was ‘unprecedented’, required ‘dramatic change’ and was 
thus ‘a quiet revolution’ (Vanstone 2005a: 7-8).2 
 
By the end of 2005, in a speech entitled ‘Beyond Conspicuous 
Compassion’, Minister Vanstone was adding a cutting moral dimension to 
her arguments about past failure and emerging change. She defined 
conspicuous compassion as ‘a culture of ostentatious caring which is about  
feeling good, not doing good’ and argued that, for those who were 
 2 
‘comfortable  indulging’ in it, the new ‘environment will be challenging’ 
(Vanstone 2005b: 1). This moral condemnation of established interests in 
Indigenous affairs who might resist the failure and change analysis was, I 
think, an interesting addition to ministerial rhetoric and be returned to later. 
 
In early 2006, a major reorganization of ministerial responsibilities saw 
Indigenous affairs relocated alongside families and community services 
under a new cabinet minister, Mal Brough. The new Minister’s policy focus 
and rhetoric, perhaps unsurprisingly, began to reflect this new grouping of 
portfolio responsibilities. In his first major speech in late April 2006, to a 
conference called the Social Innovations Dialogue, Minister Brough focused 
on the family as ‘the most important element of our society’, the 
‘fundamental building block’ through which children are instilled with 
‘values and principles’ and prepared for the ‘challenges of the future’ 
(Brough 2006a: 1). Most Australian families, he argued, are ‘strong’, and, 
with government assistance, this leads to strong communities. However a 
‘small percentage’ of Australian children, he argued, do not: 
 
receive the necessary support, nutrition, education and life skills from their 
parents or carers despite the provision of considerable financial and practical 
support from the Federal Government (Brough 2006a:1). 
 
The Minister went on to describe ‘dysfunctional families’ in which alcohol, 
drug abuse and gambling are prevalent and the cash provided by the welfare 
system is used for these purposes, rather than in caring for the children. 
Minister Brough suggested that many in his audience would be ‘familiar’ 
with such ‘circumstances’ and would have ‘devoted much thought to how to 
address these challenges’. He then referred to two other public figures who 
shared this familiarity and concern: the chair of the NIC, Sue Gordon, and 
Cape York Aboriginal leader, Noel Pearson. Dysfunctional families were 
thus seen as a particular problem in Aboriginal communities, though 
Minister Brough insisted that this was ‘not a problem unique to Aboriginal 
communities’. The Minister noted that some voluntary family income 
management arrangements had helped overcome some of these problems, 
but that voluntary arrangements were not always taken up. He argued that it 
was: 
time to take the tough decisions and move to a system that requires certain 
welfare recipients to have part of their payments directed specifically to the 
benefit of their children (Brough 2006a: 2). 
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Minister Brough believed that such families could be identified, that the 
technology was available and that it was ‘reasonable’ for 30 per cent of 
welfare payments to be directed in this way. He believed that the proposal 
‘would have a dramatic and positive impact on some indigenous 
communities’ but that it could also have a ‘positive impact… more widely’. 
He concluded in that April 2006 speech by noting that these thoughts were 
his ‘own’ and had been inspired by ‘visiting distressed Aboriginal 
communities’ but were ‘not Government policy’ (Brough 2006a: 3). 
 
While the word failure was not directly used in this first major public 
speech, Minister Brough’s sentiments about the past were clear and so too 
was his linking of these sentiments to an argument for future policy and 
organizational change. Three days before giving this speech Brough had 
announced that $3m would be directed to the Cape York Institute, headed by 
Noel Pearson, to ‘map out a new direction for Indigenous people receiving 
welfare’ (Brough 2006b). 
 
Less than a month later, on 15 May 2006, sexual abuse of Indigenous 
children erupted into national attention on the ABC’s Lateline  program 
through the revelations of a central Australian Crown Prosecutor, Nanette 
Rogers, of some horrific cases in which she had been professionally 
involved. Minister Brough’s response was to label the current situation a 
‘disgrace’ and to call for the State and Territory Governments to meet with 
the Commonwealth in a summit scheduled for June 26 to develop a 
‘National Plan for Action Against Indigenous Violence and Child Abuse’ 
(Brough 2006c). On June 21, in the lead up to that summit, further 
allegations of sexual abuse of Indigenous children were aired on Lateline 
relating to the Northern Territory Aboriginal community of Mutitjulu, 
adjacent to Uluru. In light of this development, the Chief Minister of the 
Northern Territory, Clare Martin, announced an inquiry into child abuse in 
all the Territory’s Aboriginal communities, in addition to a taskforce which 
was then being set up between the Northern Territory’s family and 
community service administration and police (Martin 2006). The inquiry 
was initially scheduled for six months, but in the event was not completed 
until April 2007. 
 
Following this outbreak of public debate over sexual abuse of 
Aboriginal children, in some ways it became unnecessary for Minister 
Brough to repeat the idea of past failure in relation to child welfare. This was 
now widely accepted. All that remained, in this policy area at least, was to 
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develop ideas for change. However, in other policy areas the diagnosis of 
past failure was not yet quite so clear.  
 
During August 2006 a raft of amendments was passed through the 
Commonwealth Parliament to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976. Some of these amendments had been agreed to by the 
land councils, after protracted negotiations, and were uncontroversial. Others 
relating to township leasing were of more recent and contested origins, but 
were defended by Minister Brough as offering more ‘choice and 
opportunity’ to Aboriginal people than past land rights arrangements in 
relation to ‘home ownership and business development on Aboriginal land’ 
(Brough 2006d).3 Then in September/October 2006, Minister Brough began 
an effort to reform the permit system that had operated on Aboriginal land 
under this Act. Under the heading ‘Permit System No Protection for the 
Vulnerable’, the Minister’s argument for change began from the idea that the 
permit system of the last ‘30 years’ had ‘contributed to dysfunction and 
exploitation’ and done ‘more harm than good’ (Brough 2006e).  
 
In December 2006, in his second major policy speech, Minister Brough 
began with some brief comments which again suggested past failure. These 
can perhaps be selectively quoted as follows: 
 
Australia… is a proud, strong and supportive nation…. But…  
Sadly, too many Indigenous Australians are not leading independent lives. They are 
not sharing the opportunities and choices. The standard of health and low life 
expectancy are unacceptable. Too many are trapped in an intergenerational cycle, a 
welfare trap that needs to be broken (Brough 2006f: 2). 
 
The Minister went on to talk of ‘families’ in Indigenous communities he had 
visited ‘crying out for help’ and of the ‘sense of urgency’ that was behind 
his ‘promoting and introducing fundamental reforms’ (Brough 2006f: 3).  
 
 In March 2007, the failure and change analysis was directed more 
specifically at the Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP), 
which the Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services 
had inherited from ATSIC in 2004. A review of the program conducted by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers stated its ‘overall conclusion’ as follows: 
 
The housing needs of Indigenous Australians in remote areas have not been well 
served and the interests and expectations of taxpayers have not been met. 
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CHIP in its current form contributes to policy confusion, complex administration and 
poor outcomes and accountability of government funded housing, infrastructure and 
municipal services. The Community Housing and Infrastructure Program should be 
abolished (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2007:16). 
 
Minister Brough’s view, when he released the report, was as follows: 
 
CHIP, previously managed by ATSIC, has clearly failed to deliver and needs urgent 
reform… 
While billions of dollars have been invested in Indigenous housing, there is little to 
show for it. 
We’ve been chasing our tail and not seeing any significant progress in overcoming 
the Indigenous housing problem in remote Australia particularly. 
The review of CHIP…found current Indigenous housing arrangements flawed and 
unsustainable. It provides a sober analysis of the situation and radical way forward 
(Brough 2007a). 
 
The report outlined a ‘new strategic framework’ which essentially involved 
combining Indigenous community housing with public housing, expanding 
public housing and providing assistance for home ownership, including in 
remote areas on community title land (Price Waterhouse Coopers 2007:23). 
The Minister’s response was that these, ‘along with other views’, would be  
‘considered by the government in exploring future directions in Indigenous 
housing’ (Brough 2007a). But as the Nicholson cartoon reminds us, Prime 
Minister Howard had already, two years earlier, clearly expressed his 
enthusiasm for increasing home ownership among Indigenous people as the 
preferred way forward (see also Sanders 2005). 
 
Over the next couple of months, these future directions in Indigenous 
housing began to emerge through a number of funding packages specific to 
particular places which Brough began announcing. In the hope of 
encouraging home ownership, many of these packages tied housing funding 
commitments to land tenure change. This led to a degree of controversy and, 
in the case of the Alice Springs town camps, to rejection of a funding 
package (Brough 2007b, 2007c). Some packages, like the ones for the Tiwi 
Islands off Darwin and for Noel Pearson’s home community of Hope Vale 
in Cape York, ranged into areas like education, sport and welfare reform, but 
all had housing and land issues at their core (Brough 2007d, 2007e).  
 
In amongst all this activity on housing and land packages, on 30 April 
2007, Northern Territory Chief Minister Clare Martin announced that she 
had received an ‘advanced copy’ of the report of the Inquiry into the 
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Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual Abuse and that it would be 
made public ‘as soon as it is printed’ in ‘about 4 weeks’ (Martin 2007a). In 
the event it was June 15, over six weeks on, before Martin could announce 
that she had been given the ‘final report’ and would table it in the 
Legislative Assembly the next week. Martin foreshadowed a ‘full response 
to the report in the August Sittings of Parliament’, but immediately 
committed her government to ‘implementing the key action areas of this 
report’ and ‘tackling this deeply disturbing issue’. She listed nine specific 
areas of action, including three areas of legislative change (Martin 2007b, 
Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual 
Abuse 2007).  
 
It is not entirely clear to me from the public record, when in this period 
Minister Brough, Prime Minister Howard and other Commonwealth officials 
gained access to the report of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry. 
Minister Brough did, however, clearly announce on June 19 that he had 
received the welfare reform report from the Cape York Institute for Policy 
and Leadership which had been funded just over a year earlier. He noted his 
agreement with the Institute about the ‘absolute priority’ of the ‘welfare of 
children’ and of ‘dealing with the causes of child neglect and abuse’. He also 
noted that the communities ‘want changes’ and thanked both the 
communities and the Institute for their involvement in a ‘high quality report 
which is ambitious and wide ranging’ (Brough 2007f, Cape York Institute 
For Policy & Leadership 2007). Noel Pearson and the Cape York Institute 
seemed to have done something in their inquiry process which, in Minister 
Brough’s and Prime Minister Howard’s judgment, Clare Martin and the 
Northern Territory Government had not. For, when the Commonwealth did 
respond to the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry, this response took a very 
different form. 
 
On 21 June 2007, Prime Minister Howard and Minister Brough held a 
joint press conference which began as follows: 
 
Well ladies and gentlemen, Mr Brough and I have called this news conference to 
announce a number of measures to deal with what we can only describe as a national 
emergency in relation to the abuse of children in indigenous communities in the 
Northern Territory. 
Anybody who’s read or examined the report prepared by Pat Anderson and Rex Wild 
entitled Little Children Are Sacred will be sickened and horrified by the level of 
abuse. They will be deeply disturbed at the widespread nature of that abuse and they 
will be looking for the responsible assumption of authority by a government to deal 
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with the problem. We are unhappy with the response of the Northern Territory 
Government (Howard 2007). 
 
Howard detailed this unhappiness with the Northern Territory Government 
and then announced eleven specific intervention measures. These measures 
were repeated in summary form in a media release by Minister Brough, as 
follows: 
 
-Introducing widespread alcohol restrictions on Northern Territory Aboriginal land. 
-Introducing welfare reforms to stem the flow of cash going towards substance abuse 
and to ensure funds meant to be for children’s welfare are used for that purpose. 
-Enforcing school attendance by linking income support and family assistance 
payments to school attendance for all people living on Aboriginal land and providing 
meals for children at school at parents’ cost. 
-Introducing compulsory health checks for all Aboriginal children to identify and 
treat health problems and any effects of abuse. 
-Acquiring townships prescribed by the Australian Government through five year 
leases including payment of just terms compensation. 
-As part of the immediate emergency response, increasing policing levels in 
prescribed communities, including requesting secondments from other jurisdictions to 
supplement NT resources, funded by the Australian Government. 
-Requiring intensified on ground clean up and repair of communities to make them 
safer and healthier by marshalling local workforces through work-for-the-dole. 
-Improving housing and reforming community living arrangements in prescribed 
communities including the introduction of market based rents and normal tenancy 
arrangements. 
- Banning the possession of X-rated pornography and introducing audits of all 
publicly funded computers to identify illegal material. 
-Scrapping the permit system for common areas, road corridors and airstrips for 
prescribed communities on Aboriginal land, and; 
-Improving governance by appointing managers of all government business in 
prescribed communities (Brough 2007g). 
 
While the word failure was not to the fore in these announcements of 
intervention and significant institutional change, the sentiment of arguing for 
change on the basis of past failure clearly was. In an interview with Prime 
Minister Howard that night on Lateline, the word failure did indeed appear. 
In response to a question which asked whether this was ‘one of the 
significant acts’ of his ‘time’, the Prime Minister replied as follows: 
 
Certainly in the social area, yes, because there has been a complete breakdown of 
these communities and this represents a cumulative failure of the policy approach 
over a long period of time. 
We are certainly suspending certain approaches and certain practices in the name of 
saving the children, because the past approach has failed (Lateline 2007). 
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Six weeks later five Bills were passed through the Commonwealth 
Parliament to enact these changes. The first focused on welfare reform and 
essentially did three things. First, it introduced a general nationwide scheme 
making income support for children conditional on school attendance and 
providing for income management in cases of parental neglect. Second, it 
introduced a specific income management scheme for the prescribed areas in 
the Northern Territory, where all residents for the next twelve months would 
have half their income support payments managed. Third, it introduced a 
scheme for Cape York which recognized a new body established under 
Queensland state law which would have some power to direct management 
of a person’s income support from Centrelink. The second and third Bills 
were directed specifically to the Northern Territory and overrode in quite 
specific detail certain aspects of the existing Commonwealth Northern 
Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978,  Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976 and Racial Discrimination Act 1975. The fourth and 
fifth were appropriations Bills, which allocated an additional $587m during 
financial year 2007-2008 to the ‘Northern Territory National Emergency 
Response’. In introducing the Bills specific to the Northern Territory, 
Minister Brough began his second reading speech as follows: 
 
When confronted with a failed society where basic standards of law and order and 
behaviour have broken down and where women and children are unsafe, how 
should we respond? Do we respond with more of what we have done in the past? Or 
do we radically change direction with an intervention strategy matched to the 
magnitude of the problem (Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 7 August 2007: 7) 
 
Here again we see a classic statement of the past failure and fundamental 
change argument which had become the driving motif of the fourth Howard 
Government in Indigenous affairs. Nicholson’s view was that ‘rough justice’ 
was being replaced by ‘Brough justice’. 
 
A Generational Revolution 
In this second, more analytic section of the essay, I want to ask what sort of 
change we have been observing in Australian Indigenous affairs under the 
fourth Howard Government? I want to begin to answer that question by 
noting two aspects of the foregoing arguments about failure and change. The 
first is that the past being denigrated in these arguments is about thirty or 
forty years, or about the length of a working career spent in Indigenous 
affairs. The second is the highly moral tone of many of these arguments, 
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with words like compassion, disgrace, disturbing and shame often to the 
fore. What seems to be going on here, as much as an argument for change, is 
a moral denigration of the previous generation of people working in 
Indigenous affairs. 
 
Building on these two observations, I want to suggest that Indigenous 
affairs is an, if not the moral cause celebre of Australian nationhood. It is 
one of the primary ways in which settler Australians, in particular, try to 
demonstrate their moral adequacy, or superiority, both to each other and to 
the world. I also want to suggest that this struggle for moral ascendancy has 
both temporal and ideological aspects. Succeeding generations of settler 
Australians characteristically believe themselves to be better at dealing with 
Indigenous issues than earlier generations and so too do competing 
ideological groupings within Australian society at any one time. This can 
lead to some interesting alliances and dynamics. 
 
Noel Pearson has also recently noted this moral dimension of 
Indigenous affairs in his columns in the Weekend Australian. In late 2006 he 
noted the moral importance of  ‘indigenous policy’ to Australia and the way 
in which it could generate ‘goodwill across the community, from the cities 
and the regions’ and ‘across the political spectrum’. However he also 
wondered ‘why has this goodwill not translated into reform? (Pearson 2006). 
Four months later, on the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the famous 1967 
Aborigines constitutional alteration referendum, Pearson answered his own 
question by suggesting that, in Indigenous affairs, Australia is ‘still divided 
into two ideological tribes’: 
 
One tribe comprising most indigenous leaders and possibly most indigenous people 
(but by no means an overwhelming majority) and their progressive supporters holds 
the view that the absence or insufficient realization of rights is the core of the 
indigenous predicament in this country. 
The other tribe comprises most non-progressive, non-indigenous Australians and 
their conservative political leaders (including substantial numbers in the Labor 
Party) who hold the view that it is the absence of responsibilities that lies at the core 
of our people’s malaise ( Pearson 2007a). 
 
Pearson sees these two ideological tribes as ‘insistent and deafly opposed 
camps’, which helps explain why Indigenous policy debate is ‘still at such a 
juvenile stage’ in Australia. He sees the rights-oriented progressives, or the 
liberal left, as having generally dominated debate in Australian Indigenous 
affairs over the years since the 1967 referendum and the more responsibility-
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oriented conservatives as having risen to prominence in more recent times. 
Pearson himself has been a major critic of the liberal left over the last eight 
years and clearly supports the rise of an approach focused more on 
behavioural responsibilities (Pearson 2007b). But he is also critical of the 
conservatives for their denial of Indigenous-specific rights and sees himself 
as trying to enunciate a more sophisticated ‘radical centre’ in Australian 
Indigenous affairs which advocates ‘a synthesis of the rights and 
responsibilities paradigms’ (Pearson 2007a). 
 
This analysis, while very general and schematic, is, I think, quite 
helpful. It suggests that there has been a generational swing in Australian 
Indigenous affairs policy debates in recent years back from the dominance of 
the liberal left towards some greater influence for the once-dominant, 
directive or protective right. It also suggests how this is a very emotive, 
tribal and ideological swing, which individuals like Pearson have great 
trouble transcending. 
 
While this generational left-right swing analysis is helpful, I think that 
there is another generational dynamic here as well. In the introduction to a 
recent book on developments and debates in Australian Indigenous studies, 
Cowlishaw, Kowal and Lea wondered whether they might have discerned a 
30 year cycle in Australian Indigenous affairs, from 1910 to 1940 then 1970 
and 2000. Having identified this idea, however, these authors then discarded 
it as obviating ‘responsibility to analyse the history that has brought us to 
this point’ in the early 2000s (Cowlishaw, Kowal and Lea 2006: 1). While 
historical details do need to be understood, it does seem to me that the idea 
of a rough 30 year, or generational, cycle in Australian Indigenous affairs 
does have some credibility. I think that this generational cycle can be related 
to another dimension of Indigenous affairs, not thus far discussed, and that is 
its deeply cross-cultural nature. 
 
Indigenous affairs is about developing relationships between a large-
scale industrial society and a number of much smaller-scale, rapidly 
changing hunter-gatherer societies. While all these societies, or cultures, are 
clearly changing, and to some extent possibly even merging through 
interaction, there is still a very clear sense in which Indigenous affairs is 
deeply cross-cultural. There are still today modern hunter-gatherers whose 
life practices are very substantially different, and to some extent 
autonomous, from those of the encapsulating industrial society, particularly 
in remote areas of Australia (Altman 1987, Tonkinson 2007). Because of 
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this cross-cultural dimension, settler government programs to ameliorate the 
circumstances and opportunities of Indigenous people seldom, if ever, work 
as intended. Things happen, through these government programs interacting 
with Indigenous agency, and through which Indigenous people may 
hopefully derive some benefit. But the results of government intervention 
are always a long way from program design (see Folds 2001). There is, in 
short, an iron law of cross-cultural unintended consequences in Indigenous 
affairs. 
 
One further consequence of this cross-cultural dimension is that it is 
very easy for participants in Indigenous affairs to begin to lose faith in what 
they are doing through government programs. Indeed I would argue that the 
cross-cultural nature of Indigenous affairs combines with its highly morally-
charged nature to produce a particular, characteristic policy dynamic; in 
which periods of pursuing a particular philosophical and organizational 
approach to Indigenous issues with some confidence and conviction 
alternate with periods of greater policy questioning and self-doubt. What 
Cowlishaw, Kowal and Lea were identifying in their dating of the rough 30 
year cycles of Australian Indigenous affairs were these recurring periods of 
rising self-doubt, the current one of which they correctly dated to the year 
2000.  
 
In the year 2000, Noel Pearson published Our Right to Take 
Responsibility, his critique of the way in which Aboriginal people had 
gained access to social security incomes in the previous 30 years in remote 
areas of Australia like Cape York, and the way in which when combined 
with access to alcohol this was rendering the communities of Cape York 
‘severely dysfunctional’ and ‘clearly unsuccessful’ (Pearson 2000: 15). In 
September 2000, a senior academic anthropologist, Professor Peter Sutton, 
delivered the Inaugural Berndt Foundation Lecture at the University of 
Western Australian which was subsequently revised and published under the 
title ‘The Politics of Suffering: Indigenous Policy in Australia Since the 
Seventies’. In the opening paragraph of that paper, Sutton argued that there 
were not ‘enough signs of improvement’ in Indigenous circumstances to 
‘allow for any further complacency about the correctness of existing 
approaches’ (Sutton 2001: 125). His second paragraph continued as follows: 
 
The contrast between progressivist public rhetoric about empowerment and self-
determination on the one hand, and the raw evidence of a disastrous failure in major 
aspects of Australian Aboriginal affairs policy since the early 1970s, is now 
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frightening. Policy revision must now go back to bedrock questions, with all bets 
off, if it is to respond meaningfully to this crisis (Sutton 2001: 125) 
 
This style of argument marked a turning point in Indigenous affairs policy, 
the beginnings of a period of collective self-doubt. In the previous twenty 
years, when things were not working as well as expected in Indigenous 
affairs, the predominant form of analysis would be to suggest that the 
existing policy approach, variously labeled self-determination or self-
management, was not being well implemented. The predominant proposed 
remedy would be for participants in Indigenous affairs to try harder 
genuinely to implement the existing policy philosophy through existing, or 
partly reformed, policy institutions. Now however, another form of analysis 
was beginning to take hold in the public rhetoric of Australian Indigenous 
affairs; the failure, crisis and fundamental change form of analysis. 
 
After Pearson and Sutton had given this other form of analysis some 
public prominence, others began to join in. In March 2002, the Northern 
Territory’s first Indigenous Minister within the new Martin Labor 
government, John Ah Kit, declared in a ministerial speech that:  
 
Aboriginal Territorians are facing a stark crisis. To say anything else would be to lie 
– and I believe that now is the time for the truth to be told. 
We cannot – indeed must not – continue to guild the lily about what is happening 
on our communities… 
The simple fact is that it is almost impossible to find a functional Aboriginal 
community anywhere in the Northern Territory (Ah Kit 2002:2) 
 
With such analyses coming from both prominent Indigenous leaders and 
respected academics, it was not long, as we have seen above, before the 
Howard Government also joined in. From there, it was but a series of  
repeated rhetorical steps to the events of June-August  2007, which can I 
think rightly be seen as the climax of a generational revolution in Australian 
Indigenous affairs. Along the way, during the term of the fourth Howard 
government, the institutional innovations and policy ideas of the previous 
generation of participants in this difficult cross-cultural and highly morally-
charged area of Australian public policy were summarily dismissed and 
discarded, in the name of failure, and a new institutional architecture and 
policy rhetoric for the next generation’s efforts in Indigenous affairs began 
to be built. 
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The final contention of this essay is that there was a similar 
generational revolution in Australian Indigenous affairs which ran from the 
mid 1960s to 1976, drawing on the same basic moral and cross-cultural 
dynamics though involving an opposite ideological swing from right to left. 
In this previous period of rising collective self-doubt, the existing objects of 
negative assessment that were said to have ‘failed’ were a policy of 
‘assimilation’ and established State and Territory native welfare 
organisations which restrictively managed Aboriginal people on areas of 
land known as reserves. In the 1960s this restrictive management was 
increasingly seen as unjust and untenable, as having failed. Restrictions on 
Aboriginal people, like limited access to alcohol and social security 
payments, began to be changed and lifted. The entry of the Commonwealth 
into Indigenous affairs on a national scale, rather than just in the Territories, 
was seen as one of the primary ways in which Indigenous affairs might be 
very significantly, even fundamentally reformed in this earlier generational 
revolution. Hence, the importance to that generational revolution of the 1967 
referendum, in which the Commonwealth extended its powers to legislate in 
regard to ‘the aboriginal race in any State’. Thereafter, the Commonwealth 
could encourage and cajole significant reform in the States knowing that it 
had a clear new legislative power.  
 
In the Northern Territory, this previous emerging revolution took the 
form of a battle between the new Canberra-based, Commonwealth Office of 
Aboriginal Affairs and the old Darwin-based Welfare Branch within the 
Northern Territory Administration of the Department of Territories. It was 
the new Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal Affairs and also Social 
Security, WC Wentworth, who in 1968 directed that there be a move away 
from the predominant existing practice of paying a large portion of the social 
security entitlements of Aboriginal people in remote areas to third parties on 
their behalf and towards direct payment to entitled individuals. The Welfare 
Branch resisted this move, but was disparaged by the new players as a self-
serving, morally-complacent established interest. As a consequence of such 
resistance, the Welfare Branch was abolished in 1972 and incorporated into 
the new Canberra-based Department of Aboriginal Affairs which grew out 
of the previous Office.  
 
I have written this brief account of the late 1960s and early 1970s in a 
way which is clearly meant to suggest some cyclical parallels with recent 
years, as well as an opposing ideological swing. If you doubt this cyclical 
parallel, I suggest you read Paul Hasluck’s Shades of Darkness: Aboriginal 
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Affairs, 1925-1965.  Hasluck had been involved in Indigenous affairs as a 
journalist and historian in Western Australia since the 1930s and then later 
far more deeply involved in the Northern Territory as Minister for 
Territories within the Commonwealth from 1951 to 1963. From 1966 
onwards, however, as his book reveals, Hasluck clearly felt very displaced 
and disparaged in a new Indigenous affairs policy environment. Hasluck’s  
penultimate chapter in that book was entitled ‘Ring in the New: Pull the Plug 
on the Old’ (Hasluck 1988). 
 
While the previous generational revolution in Australian Indigenous 
affairs began to develop during the latter half of the 1960s, it came to its 
conclusion under the Whitlam and Fraser Commonwealth Governments in 
the 1970s.  I date its conclusion to 1976, the year that the Fraser Government 
passed two pieces of legislation which had been developed during the 
Whitlam years – the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 
and the Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976. Though this 
legislation was not passed through the Commonwealth Parliament in quite 
such a dramatic fashion as the five Bills of August 2007, there was still a 
very clear sense in 1976 of a legislative climax that had been building for 
some years, and which in the process was rejecting the ideas and legislation 
of the previous generation in Indigenous affairs. By 1976, the institutions 
and ideas of the Hasluck generation in Australian Indigenous affairs had 
been declared a failure and extensively changed, even if, as in the present 
generational revolution, there were traces of institutional practice which 
carried through. 
 
I would thus contend that there have been two generational revolutions 
in Australian Indigenous affairs within the last forty years, both of which, in 
the name of failure, have similarly disparaged and discarded the work of a 
previous generation of participants in Indigenous affairs, even as they have 
also moved in opposite ideological directions. If this analysis is accepted, it 
should invite considerably more critical thinking about the nature of change 
in Australian Indigenous affairs under the fourth Howard Government. More 
fundamentally it could also invite the question, are generational revolutions 
as good as it gets in Indigenous affairs policy making? Or, can governments, 
by being aware of the moral and cross –cultural dimensions of Indigenous 
affairs and the way in which they tend to produce generational revolutions, 
possibly move beyond such revolutions? 
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